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To Impeach Or Not To Impeach: The Stability of
Juror Verdicts in Federal Courts
The general rule prohibiting juror impeachment of verdicts
was first established almost two hundred years ago.' However,
during the last century this general prohibition has come under
increasing attack.2 This comment will attempt to trace the his-
tory of the rule preventing juror impeachment of verdicts, the
policies behind the general rule, the inroads that have been
made toward liberalizing it and the possible effect two recent
developments may have on the future of the rule, namely, Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 606(b)3 and the United States Supreme
Court decision in Parker v. Gladden.4
Prior to 1785 the accepted rule was that jurors were compe-
tent to impeach their own verdicts, either in person or by af-
fidavit.5 However, when the highly respected Lord Mansfield
decided, in the case of Vaise v. Delaval6 that a juror should not
be allowed to impeach his own verdict either by the use of
testimony or by affidavit, the English rule underwent a com-
plete reversal.7 It was not long before the Mansfield doctrine, as
it came to be called, was the accepted rule in the American
courts as well.8
In the Vaise decision Mansfield refused to consider a juror
affidavit to impeach a verdict that had been reached "by lot."
His reasoning was based on the theory that "a witness shall not
be heard to allege his own moral turpitude."9 Mansfield had
1. Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
2. For discussion of various commentaries concerning the decision in
Vaise v. Delaval, see ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice,
Trial by Jury 166-69 (1968).
3. 3 Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence 606-23 (1975).
4. 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
5. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2352, at 696 (McNaughton rev. 1961); 3 J. Wein-
stein, Weinstein's Evidence § 606(04) at 606-23 (1976).
6. 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
7. 3 Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence 606-23 (1975).
8. Id.
9. 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
already applied this doctrine to other areas of the law."° Accord-
ing to Professor Wigmore however, the holding was made with
"no basis for precedent.''''
Although the theory behind Lord Mansfield's general rule has
completely disappeared today, the rule's continued existence
has led to much confusion in cases where a juror has shown that
his own verdict was irregular.' 2 As the policy behind the general
rule against juror impeachment dissipated courts were faced
with a dilemma. They could either revert to the prior rule and
once again allow jurors to testify as to the irregularities in their
verdicts or they could continue to uphold the rule by finding a
new rationale to support it. The courts chose to follow the latter
course.
3
Even the most severe critics of the general rule agree that
there are sound reasons "to protect in some measure the finality
of verdicts."' 4 While some of the federal circuit courts have
given their own reasons for adhering to the rule, 5 the United
10. For example, Mansfield had already barred married persons from tes-
tifying to non-access in bastardy cases and testimony by the drawer of commer-
cial paper.
11. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2352, at 696 (McNaughton rev. 1961) "Up to Lord
Mansfield's time and within a half decade of his decision in Vaise v. Delaval, the
unquestioned practice had been to receive jurors' testimony or affidavits with-
out scruple."
12. Kilmes v. United States, 263 F. 2d 273, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1959); 8 Wigmore,
Evidence § 2352, at 696 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
13. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178 (1953); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S.
264, 267-68(1915).
14. McCormick, Evidence § 68, at 154 (1st ed. 1954); 3 J. Weinstein, Wein-
stein's Evidence § 606(04) at 606-23 (1976).
15. Second Circuit:
United States v. Green, 523 F.2d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 1975):
This Court on a number of occasions has stressed that the strong public
interest in the integrity of jury verdicts and the protection of jurors
from harassment requires that investigation into the subjective motiva-
tions and mental processes of jurors not be permitted;
United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 950 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
984 (1962):
The court listed its reasons for application of the rule as follows: 1.
Jurors should not be subjected to harassment. 2. Courts ought not to be
burdened with large numbers of applications, mostly without merit. 3.
Chances of tampering with jury would be increased. 4. Verdicts would
become uncertain.
Third Circuit:
Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F. 2d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 1975) cert.
denied, 96 S.Ct. 1119 (1976):
The rule was formulated to foster several public policies: (1) discourag-
ing harassment of jurors by losing parties eager to have the verdict set
aside; (2) encouraging free and open discussion among jurors; (3) re-
ducing incentives for jury tampering; (4) promoting verdict finality; (5)
maintaining the viability of the jury as a judicial decision making body.
Fourth Circuit:
Hawkins v. United States, 244 F.2d 854, 856 (4th Cir. 1957):
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States Supreme Court in McDonald v. Pless16 set forth the prac-
tical considerations and policies for maintaining the rule which
have been cited with approval by numerous federal courts. The
high court stated:
The rule is based upon controlling considerations of a public policy
which in these cases chooses the lesser of two evils. When the affidavit
of a juror, as to the misconduct of himself or other members of the
jury, is made the basis of a motion for a new trial, the court must
choose between redressing the injury of the private litigant and inflict-
ing the public injury which would result if jurors were permitted to
testify as to what happened in the jury room.
But let it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly
returned can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who
took part in their publication and all verdicts could be, and many
would be followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something
which might invalidate the finding. Jurors would be harassed and
beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence
of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a
verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used the result would
be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation; the subject
of constant public investigation; to the destruction of all frankness
and freedom of discussion and conference. 7
It would introduce elements dangerous to fairness and impartiality in
the judicial process to allow jurors to impair their verdicts after they
have dispersed and opportunity has been given for the operation of
influences that had been carefully guarded against in the courtroom.
Fifth Circuit:
United States v. Howard, 505 F.2d 865, 868 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1975):
The evolved law represents an accomodation of conflicting policies: on
the one hand, the interest in stability of jury verdicts and the protection
of jurors from harassment (cite omitted); on the other hand, the preven-
tion of injustice arising from unfair trial.
Sixth Circuit:
United States v. Chereton, 309 F.2d 197, 201 (6th Cir. 1962):
Courts have not favored inquisitions of jurors feeling that jurors may
be intimidated, vexed or harassed thereby and that the practice might
lead to dangerous consequences of jury tampering with the result that
no verdict would be safe.
Eighth Circuit:
United States v. Schroeder, 433 F.2d 846, 851 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1024 (1971):
After a jury has given its verdict, has been polled in open court and has
been discharged, an individual juror's change of mind or claim that he
was mistaken or unwilling in his assent to the verdict comes too late.
Ninth Circuit:
United States v. Stacey, 475 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1973):
The reason for a rule barring a juror from testifying concerning his
own mental processes-frankness and freedom of discussion in the
jury room-applies with equal force to testimony by other jurors con-
cerning objective manifestations of those processes.
16. 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
17. Id. at 267-68; Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178 (1953); United States v.
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The choice between redressing injury to the private litigant
and avoiding the public injury which may result from allowing
jurors to impeach their verdict is no longer considered an easy
one by the United States Supreme Court, particularly when a
court is faced with a claimed violation of a defendant's constitu-
tional rights in a criminal case.
In Parker v. Gladden18 the Court, without expressly mention-
ing the prior ban against juror impeachment of verdicts, held
that the defendant was entitled to a new trial because prejudi-
cial comments had been made to the jurors by the bailiff. The
Court based its decision on the fact that the defendant's sixth
amendment right to confront all witnesses against him was de-
nied because he was not allowed to question the bailiff. Apply-
ing a similar rationale, nothing would prevent a court from
holding that a defendant is denied his right to confront all wit-
nesses against him if a juror raises facts not introduced in evi-
dence at trial during deliberations. This possibility was recog-
nized in United States ex rel Owen v. McMann, 9 where a juror
mentioned to other members of the jury during deliberations
that the defendant had been in trouble all of his life, that he had
been suspended from the police force and that he had a bad
character. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, recog-
nizing that the defendant was not granted an opportunity to
cross-examine the juror discussed the holding in Parker ° as
follows:
The invocation of the confrontation clause in Parker was entirely
appropriate to shield the defendant from comments to the jury by one
whose statements, if admissable at all, could have properly been re-
ceived only from the witness stand, subject to the procedural
safeguards which the sixth amendment requires.2'
However, the court was quick to qualify its support of the
Parker v. Gladden decision as it related to a juror's misconduct
in the jury room:
But so far as we know, the Court has never suggested that jurors,
whose duty it is to consider and discuss the factual material properly
before them become "unsworn witnesses" within the scope of the
confrontation clause simply because they have considered any factual
matters going beyond those of record. To resort to the metaphor that
the moment a juror passes a fraction of an inch beyond the record
evidence, he becomes an "unsworn witness" is to ignore centuries of
Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 79 n. 11 (2d Cir. 1974); Loney v. United States, 151 F.2d 1,
5 (10th Cir. 1945); Rogers v. Meeks, 385 F.Supp. 593, 598 (W.D. Ark. 1974); United
States v. Nystrom, 116 F.Supp. 771, 777 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
18. 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
19. 435 F. 2d 813 (2d Cir. 1970).
20. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
21. 435 F.2d at 817.
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history and assume an answer rather than to provide the basis for
one.
22
It is evident from the above analysis of the problem that the
United States Supreme Court, through its decision in Parker v.
Gladden, may have dealt a death blow to the Mansfield rule23 as
it pertains to criminal cases where the jurors consider facts not
in evidence which are brought into the jury room by a juror.
To illustrate this point one need only cite United States v.
McKinney.24 In that case the jurors considered as extra-record
testimony a prejudicial newspaper article brought into the jury
room by one of the jurors. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, after citing both Parker and Owen, was of the opinion
that the simple fact that the jurors go beyond the record evi-
dence does not automatically render the violating juror an un-
sworn witness against the defendant. Instead, the court held the
proper test to be whether there was a significant possibility that
the defendant was prejudiced by the juror misconduct. 25 This
holding is critical, for in making a determination as to whether
or not the defendant was prejudiced sufficiently to warrant a
new trial the court must receive and consider the juror affidavit.
This is contrary to the general rule. As was stated by the New
York Court of Appeals in People v. De Lucia:26
However, where the Supreme Court holds that a particular series of
events, when proven, violates a defendant's consitutional rights, im-
plicit in that determination is the right of the defendant to prove facts
substantiating his claim.
27
The New York Court of Appeals analysis of Parker appears
to be the correct approach to the problem. A defendant's right
of confrontation is no less violated when a juror becomes the
"unsworn witness" against him than when the unauthorized
statements to the jurors are made by a plaintiff. If this conclu-
sion is correct, the Parker decision will have accomplished a
22. Id.
23. The Mansfield rule is the general rule against impeachment of verdicts
by juror testimony or affidavit.
24. 429 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1970).
25. Id., at 1026.
26. 20 N.Y.2d 275, 229 N.E.2d 211 (1967). In People v. De Lucia, jurors made
an unauthorized view and reported their "extra-record findings" to the other
jurors. The court held Parker v. Gladden required the consideration of the juror
affidavits.
27. 20 N.Y. 2d at 278, 229 N.E. 2d at 213.
partial abrogation of the Mansfield rule28 via the sixth amend-
ment right of confrontation.2 9
To this point this comment has centered on the potential de-
mise of the Mansfield rule. It should be noted, however, that
with a few exceptions discussed herein the rule does survive as
the prevailing view in the circuit courts.30 The major exception
which has developed was first stated by the United States Su-
preme Court in Mattox v. United States.31 In that case, the high
court for the first time distinguished between juror testimony as
to "extraneous influences" 32 which had come to bear upon the
jury during its deliberations and evidence as to the operation of
such influences upon the juror's minds.33 In Mattox, the court
cited a decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts,34 and laid out the general rule and its exceptions as
follows:
• . .on a motion for a new trial on the ground of bias on the part of one
of the jurors, the evidence of jurors, as to the motives or influences
which affected their deliberations, is inadmissable either to impeach
or to support the verdict. But a juryman may testify to any facts
bearing upon the question of the existence of any extraneous influ-
ence, although not as to how far that influence operated upon his
mind. So a juryman may testify in denial or explanation of acts or
declarations outside of the jury room where evidence of such acts
have been given as grounds for a new trial.3 5
Since the Mattox36 decision, circuit courts have frantically
searched for an adequate definition of "extraneous influence."
Instead the courts have come up with two lists. One list consists
of those acts of interference with the jury's function which fall
under the "extraneous influence" exception. The other list in-
cludes interferences and misconduct which remain within the
28. See Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (1785).
29. It should be noted that if Parker v. Gladden is extended to include
jurors as "unsworn witnesses" against the defendant, this extension would only
apply to juror testimony in criminal cases.
30. United States v. Kohne, 358 F. Supp. 1046, 1051 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
31. 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
32. The types of juror misconduct included under this definition are listed
in Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, infra. n. 48.
33. Courts are unanimous in their decisions that juror affidavits will not be
admissable to show the effect certain extraneous influences may have had upon
the ultimate verdict of the jurors. When such influences are shown, the court
must consider what effect such juror interference would have had on the minds
of the average reasonable jury. As was stated in United States v. Crosby, 294
F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied 368 U.S. 984 (1962): "Even though presum-
ably the jurors themselves know best, the question is determined ... on the
basis of the nature of the matter and its probable effect on a hypothetical
average jury"; 294 F.2d at 950.
34. Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453 (1851).
35. 146 U.S. at 148-49.
36. Id. at 140.
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general rule. In the recent case of Government of Virgin Islands
v. Gereau,37 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit divided
the two categories as follows:
"Extraneous influence" has been construed to cover publicity re-
ceived and discussed in the jury room,38 consideration by the jury of
evidence not admitted in the court,39 and communications or other
contacts between jurors and third persons, including contacts with the
trial judge outside the presence of the defendant and his counsel.4" By
contrast, evidence of discussions among jurors, intimidation or har-
assment of one juror by another 41 and other intra-jury influences 42 on
the verdict is within the rule, rather than the exception, and is not
competent to impeach the verdict.
43
Other examples of extraneous influence include juror drunk-
enness,44 bribery,45 threats among members of the jury or from
third persons, 46 receiving incompetent documents or privately
interviewing a party.47 Thus, while the circuit courts may have
found it difficult to define the term "extraneous influence" they
have found it very easy to embrace the Mattox exception.48
37. 523 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1119 (1976).
38. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); Mattox v. United States,
146 U.S. 140 (1892); United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1972); United
States v. McKinney, 429 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Kum Seng Seo,
300 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962).
39. United States ex. rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1970);
Farese v. United States, 428 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1970) and cases cited therein at
180-81.
40. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (bailiff expressed opinion on case
to jurors); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (attempted jury tamper-
ing not revealed to defendant or counsel by trial judge); United States ex. rel.
Tobe v. Bessinger, 492 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1974) (bailiff in answer to jury queries
directed to judge told jury they must deliberate until they reached a verdict);
Truscott v. Chaplin, 403 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1968) (inquiry by judge whether jury
close to verdict); United States v. Gersh, 328 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1964) (phone calls
to juror); Wheaton v. United States, 133 F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1943) (bailiff instructed
jury).
41. United States v. Blackburn, 446 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Stoppelman, 406 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1969); United States v. Kafee
214 F.2d 887 (3d Cir. 1954).
42. United States v. Kohne, 358 F. Supp. 1046 (W.D. Pa. 1973) and cases cited
therein.
43. Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 149-50 (3d. Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1119 (1976).
44. Faith v. Neely, 41 F.R.D. 361 (N.D.W. Va. 1966).
45. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954); United States v. Rakes, 74
F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Va. 1947).
46. Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1968).
47. Jorganson v. York Ice Machinery Corporation, 160 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.
1947).
48. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954); Government of Virgin
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As the courts began to adopt the exception, they also began to
draw distinctions as to the types of juror testimony which would
remain under the prohibition of the Mansfield rule. One general
statement was that jurors would not be allowed to impeach their
verdict as to any matters that "inhered in the verdict. ' 49 While
courts continue to recite this phrase as grounds for rejection of
juror affidavits, few courts have ever taken the time to explain
its true meaning. The term "inhere in the verdict" has developed
to include those matters which pertain to jurors mental proc-
esses within the confines of the jury room. It is argued that to
allow such juror testimony would lead to retrospective falsifica-
tion by jurors as well as harassment of jurors by losing parties.
A slightly more definitive approach has been taken by courts
which will not allow jurors to testify as to the subjective effects
of the intrusions upon their mental processes. 50 This approach is
similar Wigmore's statement that jurors will not be heard as to
their "state of mind" during deliberations. 51 The policy behind
this "mental process" or "state of mind" approach is clear.52 If
losing parties were allowed a new trial based on juror's state-
ments that certain prejudicial information did affect their ver-
dict, jurors would cease to have a day's rest until they gave in to
defeated litigants demands that they testify to such influence.
Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 149 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 96 S. Ct. 1119
(1976); United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 79, n.12 (2d. Cir. 1974); United
States v. Butler, 317 F.2d 249, 262 (8th Cir. 1963); Walker v. United States, 298
F.2d 217, 226 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. Grieco, 261 F.2d 414, 415 (2d Cir.
1959); United States v. Furlong, 194 F.2d 1, 4-5 (7th Cir. 1952); Wheaton v. United
States, 133 F.2d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 1943); Lancaster v. United States, 39 F.2d 30, 33
(5th Cir. 1930).
49. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 383 (1911); Government of Virgin
Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 149 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1119
(1976); Hawkins v. United States, 244 F.2d 854, 856 (4th Cir. 1957); Bryson v.
United States, 238 F2d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 1956); Young v. United States, 163 F.2d
187, 188 (10th Cir. 1947); United States v. Kohne, 358 F. Supp. 1046,1052 (W.D. Pa.
1973); Castaldi v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 681, 684 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
50. Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140,149 (3d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1119 (1976); United States v. Green, 523 F.2d 229, 235 (2d
Cir. 1975); United States v. Howard, 505 F.2d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 1974).
51. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2349, at 691 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
52. Rothstein, Federal Rules of Evidence, Appendix § 606(b) (1973) at 78
states:
The mental operations and emotional reactions of jurors in arriving at
a given result would, if allowed as a subject of inquiry, place every
verdict at the mercy of the jurors and invite tampering and harass-
ment. The-authorities are in virtual accord in excluding the evidence.
Also see United States v. Grieco, 261 F.2d 414, 415 (2d Cir. 1959) where the court
held:
It is not possible to determine mental processes of jurors by the strict
tests available in an experiment in physics; we have to deal with human
beings, whose opinions are inevitably to some extent subject to emo-
tional controls that are beyond any accessible scrutiny.
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This could lead to the ultimate perversion of the concept of the
"sanctity of the jury room. ' 53 This same rationale has prohib-
ited juror testimony as to juror arguments which were im-
proper5 4 as well as testimony as to the motives or influences
which affected the deliberations.5 5
Another exception to the general prohibition against juror
impeachment recognized by many federal courts is that jurors
may testify as to overt acts which are known to the other
jurors. 56 This overt act exception was recognized as long ago as
1915, when in McDonald v. Pless,5 7 the United States Supreme
Court stated:
* * * by statute in some states, and by decisions in a few others, the
jurors affidavit as to an overt act of misconduct, which was capable of
being controverted by other jurors was made admissible. And, of
course, the argument in favor of receiving such evidence is not only
very strong, but unanswerable-when looked at solely from the stand-
point of the private party who has been wronged by such conduct.58
As with the "extraneous influence exception" the federal
courts have had a difficult time in determining what qualifies as
an "overt act." The methods used by the federal courts in apply-
ing these two exceptions are developed by the following
analysis of cases pertaining to specific areas of jury miscon-
duct.
A. Juror Misunderstanding of Jury Instructions
In United States v. Stacey,59 within twenty minutes after the
guilty verdict was returned three of the jurors approached
counsel for defendant and informed him that if they had known
that intent was a necessary element of the crime of counterfeit-
ing they would have voted to acquit the defendant. The defend-
ant requested that the judge conduct an evidentiary hearing
based on this juror information. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit refused to grant defendant's request and cited the
majority rule; to wit:
53. Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 739, 745-46 (4th Cir. 1948).
54. Williams v. United States, 3 F.2d 933, 936 (6th Cir. 1925).
55. United States v. Green, 523 F.2d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Butler, 317 F.2d 249, 262 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. Furlong, 194 F.2d 1, 5
(7th Cir. 1952).
56. Gafford v. Warden, 434 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1970).
57. 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
58. Id. at 268.
59. 475 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1973).
After a verdict is returned a juror Will not be heard to impeach the
verdict when his testimony concerns his misunderstanding of the
court's instructions.60
The Stacey decision is the most recent federal case dealing
with a juror misunderstanding of jury instructions and follows
a long line of cases reaching similar results.6 1 Professor Wig-
more's work on the law of evidence is in accord with the Stacey
decision6 2 as is the latest amendment to the Federal Rules of
Evidence.63 The uniformity upon this question is due to two
factors. Many federal courts do not consider juror misunder-
standing of instructions to be misconduct. Other federal courts
refuse to accept affidavits from jurors to this effect because
they feel that to do so would be to consider the mental processes
of the jurors during their deliberations.
B. Juror Misunderstanding of the Law
The majority rule in the federal courts is that a juror is incom-
petent to impeach his verdict by testifying that he did not under-
stand the law involved in the case.64 In United States v. Chere-
ton,65 the defendant based his motion for new trial upon the
affidavits of four jurors. The jurors stated that they believed
they had found the defendant guilty of conspiracy. However,
the judge had dismissed the conspiracy count prior to giving the
case to the jury for its consideration. The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit refused to admit the juror affidavits, clearly
stating a distinction between a mistake by the entire jury as to
the nature of the verdict announced in open court and a mistake
by individual jurors. The court held:
It is one thing for jurors to make a unanimous mistake in respect to a
matter actually submitted to them. It is something entirely different
for individual jurors to claim that they found defendant guilty of an
offense which was never submitted to them for their determination. 66
The distinction between mistake by one juror and mistake by
60. Id. at 1121.
61. Walker v. United States, 298 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1962); Medina v. United
States, 254 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1958); Bryson v. United States, 238 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.
1956); United States v. Parelius, 83 F. Supp. 617 (Haw. 1949).
62. 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2349 at 690 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
63. Rothstein, Federal Rules of Evidence, Appendix § 606(b) (1973) at p. 78:
"Thus testimony or affidavits of jurors have been held incompetent to show
misinterpretation of instructions."
64. James v. United States, 191 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (juror felt he could
not change his vote); United States v. Nystrom, 116 F. Supp. 771 (W.D. Pa. 1953)
(Juror believed that in criminal case majority rule controlled and therefore he
changed his vote).
65. 309 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1962).
66. Id. at 201.
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the entire jury was also considered by the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit in Young v. United States. 67 In that case the
court held:
The rule (against impeachment of juror verdicts). . . does not prevent
the reception of evidence of jurors to show that through mistake, the
real verdict on which agreement was reached in the jury room was not
correctly expressed in the verdict returned in open court. . . . (But)
• . . jurors cannot be heard to testify that while the substance of the
verdict returned into court was understood, it was predicated upon a
. . . misrepresentation of the law.
68
In United States v. Crosby,69 one of the jurors, by affidavit,
claimed that he had misinterpreted a guilty plea by another
defendant to implicate Crosby. The juror stated that this had, in
fact, influenced his verdict. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit rejected the juror's affidavit.
This reluctance to accept juror affidavits in the area of misun-
derstanding of law also stems from the fear that otherwise an
examination of the mental processes involved in the jurors'
deliberations would be required.
C. Juror Misunderstanding of or Failure to Consider Certain
Evidence
Unanimous agreement concerning this question follows the
decision in United States v. Dressler.71 In that case juror af-
fidavits were presented to the court to show that the jury failed
to consider certain evidence-introduced at trial. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to consider such af-
fidavits. The court equated accepting such juror testimony with
allowing jurors to testify that they had not understood or paid
attention to jury instructions.71
D. Juror Claims of Harassment or Pressure by Other Jurors
While the general rule is that jurors may not impeach a verdict
by testimony that they were pressured or coerced into finding
the defendant guilty72 this rule is by no means settled. In John-
67. 163 F.2d 187 (10th Cir. 1947).
68. Id. at 189.
69. 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 984 (1962).
70. 112 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1940).
71. Id. at 979.
72. United States v. Khone, 358 F. Supp. 1046 (W.D. Pa. 1973). See 8 Moore's
son v. Hunter,73 a black juror claimed that she had been intimi-
dated by the eleven white jurors to vote for conviction. The
court admitted that if the allegation of the juror was true the
defendant would be entitled to a new trial, but the court denied
a motion for new trial on the ground that the juror was incompe-
tent to testify as to any such pressure.
The Johnson v. Hunter decision represents the traditional
approach to the problem. It is a blatant example of the possible
injustice caused when a court accepts established rules blindly
without fully considering the realities of the situation.
The more reasonable approach in cases where a juror alleges
coercion on the part of a fellow juror is to determine, by the use
of the juror affidavit alone, what degree of coercion is being
alleged. If the judge decides that the affidavit claims that only
normal pressures and intra-jury influences came to bear, then
the judge would be justified in refusing to conduct an eviden-
tiary hearing based on such affidavit.74 However, if the affidavit
alleges that the juror was actually threatened with physical
violence or was told that if she did not change her vote she
would have to appear before the judge and would be fined,75
then justice would require the court to accept the affidavit and
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the credibility of
the juror's statements. 76 The court would then be in a position to
determine if such juror misconduct required a new trial.
E. Jurors Claims of Fatigue, Exhaustion, Inability to Think
Clearly
When a juror claims that he was incapable of performing his
jury duty adequately because of personal, emotional or physical
factors, the prevailing view is not to admit such testimony. 77
Two federal district court cases illustrate different ways to deal
with this problem. In United States v. Ross, 78 the defendant's
motion for new trial was based in part upon the affidavit of one
juror that she was upset during deliberations because her hus-
Federal Practice, § 31:08, at 31-55-6; 8 Wigmore, Evidence 2345-56 (McNaughton
rev. 1961); Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 554 at 493-94.
73. 144 F.2d 565 (10th Cir. 1944).
74. Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140,151 (3d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1119 (1976).
75. Crenshaw v. United States, 116 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1940).
76. Gafford v. Warden, 434 F.2d 318, 321 (10th Cir. 1970).
77. ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Approved
Draft, Trial by Jury, § 5.7, commentary following section provides: "a juror
would not be permitted to testify that he was induced to agree to a verdict
because his wife was ill and he was anxious to get home."
78. 203 F. Supp. 100 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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band had been in a serious auto accident prior to trial. The
argument by defendant was that due to the juror's emotional
state she was not able to exercise her best judgment. The district
court judge denied the motion after interrogating the juror and
satisfying himself that she was not hampered by her personal
problems. Thus, in this case the judge did accept the juror
affidavit, and conducted his own evidentiary hearing before
denying the motion for new trial.
In United States v. Kohne79 the juror affidavit stated that the
cots in the hotel room where the jurors were quartered were bad
and that the juror was worried during the trial that his erratic
heater might explode. The court was not impressed by the
juror's complaints and stated:
(The jurors) urgent desire to go home because of the erratic heater and
the hotel cot are not sufficient grounds to impeach the verdicts.8 0
The court in Kohne is guilty of the common offense of saying
one thing and doing another. While stating that it would not
accept the juror affidavit to impeach the verdict, the court did in
fact consider the affidavit denying the motion for a new trial
only after determining the sufficiency of this juror grievance.
F. Juror Prejudice
When a juror by affidavit states that a fellow juror made
prejudicial remarks about the defendant during deliberations
the courts are faced with a difficult problem. Must the courts
always ignore the affidavit, regardless of the derogatory nature
of the alleged remarks; or may the juror's affidavit be admitted
under certain circumstances? Unless the alleged prejudice
amounts to a showing that the juror perjured himself during
voir dire, the prevailing view appears to be that the affidavit will
not be admitted.81
The exception to this general prohibition occurs where the
juror affidavit is offered to prove that the offending juror had
pre-conceived notions as to the defendant's guilt or personal
knowledge of the facts of the case. Under these limited condi-
tions the affidavit may be admissable to show that the juror lied
79. 358 F. Supp. 1046 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
80. Id. at 1050.
81. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2354, at 712 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
during voir dire examination. 82 However, the distinction be-
tween the rule and its exception with regard to juror prejudice
is difficult to apply. Where it is alleged that one of the jurors
stated that the defendant must be guilty because of his long hair
or because of his religion it would seem clear that the defendant
has not been tried before a truly unbiased jury. One the other
hand, to require every verdict to be by an entirely unbiased jury
would be to set an unrealistic standard.8 3 As was stated by the
Court Appeals for the Second Circuit in Jorgenson v. York Ice
Machinery Corporation:84
.. . it would be impracticable to impose the counsel of absolute per-
fection that no verdict shall stand, unless every juror has been entirely
without bias, and has based his vote only upon the evidence he has
heard in court. It is doubtful whether more than one in a hundred
verdicts would stand such a test; and although justice may require as
much, the impossibility of achieving it has induced judges to take a
middle course, for they have recognized that the institution could not
otherwise survive; they would become Penelopes, forever engaged in
unraveling the web they wove. Like much else in human affairs, its
defects are so deeply enmeshed in the system that wholly to disentan-
gle them would quite kill it.85
Two cases dealing with prejudicial juror remarks illustrate
that the federal court system has become reconciled to the prop-
osition that a totally unbiased jury may only exist in constitu-
tional law textbooks. In Young v. United States86 an affidavit
was submitted which alleged that a juror had stated that the
defendant was a bad man and that he was a member of the
syndicate. Relying on the traditional maxim that a juror will not
be heard to impeach his verdict as to matters which inhere in it,
the court refused to admit the affidavit.87 In Bates v. Dickson88
the defendant, by petition for habeas corpus, alleged that he
was denied a fair trail because of one of the jurors statements
during deliberations that the defendant was a member of the
"rat-pack" gang. Standing firm behind the general rule the
court refused to admit the juror affidavit.
The above cases indicate how convenient the federal courts
find Mansfield's general rule against juror impeachment. By
reference to the rule they can avoid the responsibility of decid-
ing whether in fact the defendant was given a fair and impartial
trial. Others argue that, although it may appear that defendants
in a criminal case are being denied a fair trial by application of
82. 3 J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence 606(04) at 606-35 (1976).
83. Jorgenson v. York Ice Corporation, 160 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1947).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 435.
86. 163 F.2d 187 (10th Cir. 1947).
87. Id. at 188-89.
88. 226 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
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this rule, such a sacrifice is necessary if the institution of trial by
jury is to survive. Nonetheless, a system which allows a person
to lose his or her liberty without inquiry being made into
whether that person has had a fair trial may not be worthy of
survival. In balancing these two principles we are reminded by
Judge Weinstein, of the Eastern District of New York, in his
work on the Federal Rules of Evidence that:
it seems better to draw the line in favor of juror privacy; in the heat of
juror debate all kinds of statements may be made which have little
effect on outcome, though taken out of context they seem damning
and absurd.89
G. Compromise and Majority Vote Verdicts
Hyde v. United States9" is the spoken word of the United
States Supreme Court on whether jurors may impeach their
verdict by affidavits which state that the verdict was a product
of either a compromise or majority vote. In Hyde, jurors ad-
mitted that they had agreed to vote for conviction on one count
only after receiving concessions from other jurors on other
counts. Citing the basic warning against allowing what was
intended to be a private deliberation to become a constant sub-
ject of public investigation, the high court refused to allow the
juror affidavits. The Hyde decision has been followed by the
federal circuit and district courts.9 1 The lone dissenting voices
on the topic are those of Professor Wigmore92 and of the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Committee on Minimum Standards.9 3 It is
unfortunate that the Federal Rules of Evidence, Section 606(b)
89. 3 J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence 606(04) at 606-36 (1976). See Roth-
stein, Federal Rules of Evidence, Appendix § 606(b) (1973) which states: "Permit-
ting jurors to air each statement made by their fellow jurors would surely
undermine the values the Rule is designed to protect."
90. 225 U.S. 347 (1911).
91. Young v. United States, 163 F.2d 187 (10th Cir. 1947); Loney v. United
States, 151 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1945); United States v. Kohne, 358 F. Supp. 1046
(W.D. Pa. 1973).
92. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2350 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
93. The American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for
Criminal Justice, Trial by Jury section, felt that an explicit exception to the
general Mansfield rule was required to permit jurors to testify as to compro-
mise, majority or quotient verdicts. Rule 5.7 under that section provides: "(a)
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, no evidence shall be received to
show the effect of any statement, conduct, event or condition upon the mind of
any juror or concerning the mental processes by which the verdict was deter-
mined (b) the Limitations in subsection (a) shall not bar evidence concerning
whether the verdict was reached "by lot" (emphasis added by author).
did not clear up this dispute, remaining silent upon the issue of
compromise or majority vote verdicts. 94
H. Juror Intoxication
While the current federal case law on this area is sparse, both
Faith v. Neely 95 and the Federal Rules of Evidence 96 are in
accord that a juror will be permitted to testify if one of the
jurors was intoxicated during the deliberations.
A strong argument can be made that the federal view on
intoxication is inconsistent with its view on individual juror
prejudice. The reason given for allowing a juror to testify that
one of the jurors was intoxicated during deliberation is that one
under the influence of alcohol becomes mentally clouded to the
point where he cannot make an intelligent determination as to
the guilt or innocence of the accused. When a juror has a certain
prejudice 97 and he makes that prejudice known to the other
jurors in the jury room, he also cannot make an intelligent,
unbiased determination as to the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused. Yet, juror testimony is admitted for intoxication, while
testimony as to prejudice is generally excluded. The rationale
behind this disparity may rest in the fact that courts are of the
opinion that a "prejudiced person" will be able to cast aside
those prejudices when determining the guilt or innocence of the
accused while an intoxicated juror has placed himself in a situa-
tion where he will not be able to do so. Another possible expla-
nation is based on the internal/external distinction. A juror's
prejudices, once revealed, become an "internal" part of the jury
deliberations, and therefore no affidavits are allowed as to such
prejudice. A juror's intoxication is an "external influence" that
came to bear on the juror and therefore is subject to juror
affidavit.
I. Juror Offer or Acceptance of a Bribe
The leading case on this point is Remmer v. United States.9 8
In that case it was learned by defendants after trial that one
juror had been approached by a person who offered him a bribe
if he would make certain that the jurors returned a not guilty
verdict. Without expressly making reference to the general rule
against juror impeachment, the United States Supreme Court
94. 3 J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence 606(04) at 606-41 (1976).
95. 41 F.R.D. 361, 366 (N.D.W. Va. 1966).
96. 3 J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence 606(04) at 606-31 (1976).
97. E.g., when a juror is anti-black or anti-long hair, etc.
98. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
[VOL. 4:343, 1977] To Impeach or Not to Impeach
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
held that an evidentiary hearing was required to determine the
prejudice that may have been caused by the bribe offer. It is
evident that the Remmer decision rested on the conclusion that
offering a bribe to a juror qualifies as an "extraneous influ-
ence" within the exception to the Mansfield rule.99
J. Threats to Jurors
One of the leading exceptions to the Mansfield rule is that
jurors may testify as to threats made to them by third parties.
Such an interference with jury deliberations is the most obvious
example of an extraneous influence. This conclusion was
reached by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Mil-
ler v. United States'0 0 and has also been adopted by the Federal
Rules of Evidence.' 0 l
K. Unauthorized Views by Jurors
The federal courts have not been faced with this type of juror
misconduct frequently. When the problem has arisen, however,
the policy has been to consider such conduct as an "overt act"
and thereby allow the juror affidavit to impeach the verdict.
10 2
In Gafford v. Warden10 3 a juror's affidavit was offered by the
defendant as a basis for a new trial. The affidavit stated that a
fellow juror had made an unauthorized view of the gas station
mentioned in the testimony to ascertain whether the gas station
was open at the time stated at trial. The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit considered the United States Supreme Court
holdings in both Parker v. Gladden'04 and Mattox v. United
States10 5 and held:
We are concerned with overt acts,.., the journey to the gas station to
ascertain whether it had been open at the claimed time ... We believe
that the affidavit of Juror Field must be considered. 10 6
In reaching this conclusion the court was aware that this juror
probably became an "unsworn witness" against the defendant
99. Also see United States v. Rakes, 74 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Va. 1947).
100. 403 F.2d 77, 83, n.11 (2nd Cir. 1968).
101. 3 J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence 606(04) at 606-31 (1976).
102. Id. at 606-32.
103. 434 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1970).
104. 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
105. 146 U.S. 140, 148-9 (1892).
106. 434 F.2d at 320.
when he made the unauthorized view and then returned to re-
port his findings to the other jurors. 107 The court also made a
clear distinction between "overt acts" and the "personal con-
ciousness" of a juror, explaining:
Although the personal consciousness of a juror cannot be explored
and one juror cannot on the basis of non-accessible thoughts and
feelings overturn the decision of the jury, overt acts which are sus-
ceptible to the knowledge of other jurors may be established by the
evidence of a juror.10 8
L. Juror Experimentation
Only one recent federal case has spoken to the question of
improper juror experimentation in the jury room. 109 In United
States v. Beach 10 the defendant was on trial for perjury. Beach
had stated that he did not know illegal gambling was taking
place in his home. Evidence presented at trial showed that add-
ing machines were being used in his home to further this illegal
operation and that therefore he must have heard them. The
machines were admitted into evidence, but they were not played
for the jury. During deliberations the jurors requested that an
electrical cord be brought into the jury room. The request was
granted and the juror affidavit stated that the jurors then pro-
ceeded to conduct an experiment with the machines to test their
noise level. The results of such an experiment would not have
been accurate since in the jury room no padding was used under
the machines, while testimony at trial had shown that such
padding had been used to lessen the noise when the machines
were in operation in the defendant's home.
The question before the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit was whether a juror affidavit could be admitted in an at-
tempt to impeach the verdict. In deciding to admit the affidavit
the court spoke of the policy behind allowing jurors to testify as
to overt acts of misconduct. They stated:
... But as to overt acts, they are accessible to the knowledge of all the
jurors; if one affirms misconduct the remaining eleven can deny; one
cannot disturb the action of twelve; it is useless to tamper with one, for
the eleven can be heard. Under this view of the law the affidavits were
properly received. They tended to prove something which did not
essentially inhere in the verdict, an overt act, open to the knowledge of
all the jury, and not alone within the personal consciousness of one.' 11
107. The court extended the holding in Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966)
to include juror misconduct inside the jury room and juror misconduct in
conducting unauthorized views.
108. 434 F.2d at 320.
109. United States v. Beach, 296 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1961).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 160.
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The fourth circuit cited Professor Wigmore as authority for its
decision. 112 With the Parker v. Gladden"3 holding coming short-
ly after Beach the viability of the Beach decision appears to
have been strengthened.
M. Media Influence on Juror Verdicts
While some federal courts have refused to allow jurors to
impeach their verdict by affidavits to show media interfer-
ence," 4 the more sensible approach is to the contrary. 1 5 In
United States v. Reid" 6 the United States Supreme Court was
asked to determine the admissability of affidavits from two
jurors to the effect that a newspaper article concerning the case
had been sent to a fellow juror. This fellow juror admitted that
he had read the article during deliberations to refresh his mem-
ory. The Supreme Court neatly sidestepped the issue with the
following comment:
It would perhaps hardly be safe to lay down any general rule upon the
subject. Unquestionably such evidence ought always be received with
great caution. But cases might arise in which it would be impossible to
refuse them without violating the plainest principles of justice. 17
Since the Reid decision an increasing number of circuit
courts have found that to disallow juror affidavits would violate
the "plainest principles of justice". For example, in United
States v. Crosby"8 the court's opinion was that if the juror
affidavit stated that a juror had read a prejudicial newspaper
account of the case, or other media item, such affidavit should
be received. Likewise, in United States v. Kum Seng Seo" 9
affidavits were submitted which showed that some jurors had
come in contact with a highly prejudicial newspaper article
which included statements that defendant was held on a very
high bail and that the illegal narcotics were found in the defend-
ant's room. Implicit in the court's granting of a new trial was the
belief that such juror affidavits were admissable to impeach the
112. 8 Wigmore Evidence § 2352-53 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
113. 385 U.S. 365 (1966).
114. Moore v. United States, 125 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1942).
115. United States v. Kum Seng Seo, 300 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962); United
States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961).
116. 12 How. 361 (1851).
117. Id. at 366.
118. 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961).
119. 300 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962).
verdict under the "extraneous influence exception." Both Pro-
fessor Wigmore' 20 and the Federal Rules of Evidence'21 are in
accord with this holding.
N. Juror Consideration of Facts Not In Evidence
No area of law better reflects the maxim "it would. . . hardly
be safe to lay down a general rule on the subject"'2 2 than does
the topic of juror consideration of facts outside the record.
Many federal courts have refused to admit such testimony rely-
ing on the Mansfield rule.'2 3 Even after the United States Su-
preme Court had carved out its "extraneous influence excep-
tion"'2 4 many courts continued to adhere to prior decisions by
drawing a dividing line between what was and what was not an
"extraneous influence." The most convenient line to draw was
that between influences that came to bear on the jury from
within the jury room and those which intruded upon the jurors
from without. 25 After this approach came under attack for
failing to confront the real problem 126 defenders of the Mans-
field rule began to adopt a highly realistic approach. 127
In United States v. McMann, 28 when discussing the problem
of juror consideration of extra-record facts, the court attempted
to put the problem in proper perspective:
... we suspect there are many cases where jurors make statements
concerning the general credibility or incredibility of the police, the
need of backing them up even when there is reasonable doubt or
putting brakes on them when there is none, the desirability of over-
coming reasonable doubt because of the repugnance of particular
crimes or of yielding to less than reasonable doubt because of their
insignificance and concerning other matters that would invalidate a
judgment if uttered by a judge .... Yet this is the very stuff of the
120. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2354(c), at 703 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
121. 3 J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence 606(04) at 606-32 (1976).
122. United States v. Reid, 12 How. 361, 366 (1851).
123. Parsons v. United States, 188 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1951); Young v. United
States, 163 F.2d 187 (10th Cir. 1947); United States v. Dressier, 112 F.2d 972 (7th
Cir. 1940); Ramsey v. United States, 27 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1928).
124. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
125. United States v. Furlong, 194 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1952). Also see Roth-
stein, Federal Rules of Evidence, Appendix § 606(b) (1973) where it is stated:
"... (s)ubstantial authority refuses to allow a juror to disclose irregularities in
the jury room, but allows his testimony as to irregularities occuring outside."
126. Certainly a defendant's right to a fair trial cannot be determined on the
sole basis of whether his rights were violated within the jury room or 50 feet
outside that "sanctuary."
127. United States ex rel. Owens v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); United States v. McKinney, 429 F.2d 1019 (5th
Cir. 1970); Jorgenson v. York Ice Machinery Corporation, 160 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.
1947).
128. 435 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1970).
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jury system, and we have recognized. . . that the standards for judges
and jurors are not the same.129
Other authorities defending the rule prohibiting juror tes-
timony regarding consideration of extra-record testimony in-
clude Professor Wigmore13 0 and the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.131
While the tide appears to be turning in favor of admitting such
testimony, recent federal court decisions still uphold the tradi-
tional rule. 132 Several recent cases, however, have begun to ac-
cept juror affidavits concerning the jury's consideration of facts
not in evidence, some of them based on the "extraneous influ-
ence exception.' 1 33 Other courts believe that such misconduct
violates the defendant's sixth amendment right of confronta-
tion.134 One case that has taken this latter approach is United
States v. Thomas:135 In that case the jurors' affidavits stated
that one of the jurors had tried to influence the verdict based on
an inadmissable newspaper article. The court held:
. . . we support the approach outlined in the American Bar Associa-
tion's Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to
Trial by Jury, Section 5.7(c) Approved Draft, 1968, which states that a
juror's testimony or affidavit shall be received when it concerns
whether matters not in evidence came to the attention of one or more
jurors, under circumstances which would violate the defendant's con-
stitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.
136
In Downey v. Peyton,'3 7 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit admitted similar juror affidavits claiming that the
jurors were not testifying about their mental impressions or
what went on in the jury room but only whether events not
introduced in evidence were discussed in the jury room. The
court in allowing the affidavits held:
Such a factual inquiry is sanctioned in Rees v. Peyton, 341 F.2d 859 (4
Cir. 1965). There, it is stated that "a juror may after verdict be queried
129. Id. at 817-18.
130. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2354 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
131. 3 J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence 606(04) at 606-39 (1976).
132. United States v. Sanchez, 380 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
133. Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140,149 (3d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied 96 S. Ct. 1119 (1976); Downey v. Peyton, 451 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1971).
134. United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1972); Gafford v.
Warden U.S. Penitentiary, 434 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1970).
135. 463 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1972).
136. Id. at 1064.
137. 451 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1971).
as to information, whether documentary or oral in nature, introduced
into the jury room but not put before them at trial.138
PROPOSAL BY WARREN BURGER
In 1959, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit made an unprecedented attack on the practicality of the
Mansfield approach to the juror impeachment question. 139 The
court's response to the problem was drastic, in that the opinion
called for the acceptance of all juror affidavits. What makes the
decision even more notable is its author, the current Chief Jus-
tice of the United States Supreme Court, Warren Burger, who at
that time was serving as a circuit court judge.
In the decision, Judge Burger noted that when faced with
juror impeachment of verdict questions federal courts were
saying one thing and doing another. He explained:
Courts have again and again ostensibly endorsed Mansfield's rule
against the use of juror's statements, but it appears, that almost with-
out exception, where it has been said that a juror's affidavit or tes-
timony is "inadmissable" the court has in fact considered what the
juror has said but rejected it as insufficient. 40
Burger concurred with Judge Learned Hand in his opinion that
this approach to the problem was simply "an easy escape from
embarassing choices."' 4' Judge Burger suggested his solution to
the juror impeachment problem in these words:
The crux of the problem would be more clear if we regard the issue
not as the admissability of the juror's affidavit but rather its sufficien-
cy for purposes of impeaching the verdict. We should not dispose of
this case on the ground of admissibility. Rather we should view it as
Judge Hand did and consider what the affidavit says, and assuming
its truth for these purposes then decide whether it should lead to
reversal.142
This approach while deserving of merit, has not been adopted
by the federal courts generally. This is either because Burger
failed to consider the effect of his proposal on the policy behind
the current rule 4 3 or because of the general resistance to change
throughout the federal court system.
138. Id. at 239.
139. Kilmes v. United States, 263 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
140. Id. at 274.
141. Jorgenson v. York Ice Machinery Corporation, 160 F.2d 432,435 (2d Cir.
1947).
142. Kilmes v. United States, 263 F.2d 273, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
143. Harassment of jurors, finality of verdicts, sanctity of jury room; see
note 18.
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THE EFFECT OF THE PASSAGE OF FEDERAL RULE
OF EVIDENCE 606(B)
Congress has spoken as to the proper course for the federal
courts to follow when faced with various types of juror miscon-
duct with the passage of section 606(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 144 Due to its critical importance to the direction of the
law in this area the rule is presented in full below:
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror
may not testify as to any matter or statement occuring during the
course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his
or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent or
dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental proc-
esses in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or
evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he
would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.141
In debate over the final wording of section 606(b) the House of
Representatives version was more liberal than that of the Sen-
ate. The House version would have allowed jurors to testify as to
objective matters occuring during deliberations, such as mis-
conduct by another juror or a compromise verdict. The Senate
version did not allow such juror testimony, but it did permit
jurors to testify as to whether extraneous prejudicial informa-
tion was improperly brought to the jury's attention. 146 After
much discussion the Conference Committee adopted the Senate
version. 147
The purpose of the Federal Rule is clear. As stated by Judge
Weinstein, 148 606(b) "seeks to reach an accommodation between
policies designed to safeguard the institution of trial by jury and
policies designed to insure a just result in the individual case."' 149
The values sought to be promoted by the Rule include freedom
144. 3 J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence 606(04) at 606-01 (1976).
145. Id.
146. Conference Report, H.R. Rep. No. 93-1597, Congressional Report, H
11930 (daily edition, December 14, 1974). See 3 J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evi-
dence 606(04) at 606-9-10 (1976);
147. Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140,149 n.20 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1119 (1976); 3 J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence
606(04) at 606-9 (1976).
148. In his work on the Federal Rules of Evidence.
149. 3 J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence 606(04) at 606-24 (1976).
of deliberation, stability and finality of verdicts and protection
of jurors against harassment and embarrasment. 150 However, it
is recognized that immunizing the verdict against all inquiry can
lead to irregularity and injustice. 151
Although Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) was adopted in
January, 1975, it has already stirred controversy. Legal scholars
are attempting to determine its effect upon the existing case
law. At least one recent circuit court has concluded that "the
rule as adopted, tracked existing case law.' ' 152 The manner in
which the Rule deals with various problems discussed in this
comment will show whether or not that court's conclusion is
accurate.
The Federal Rule supports the almost unanimous opinion of
the federal courts that a juror is barred from testifying as to the
motives or mental processes by which the jurors reached their
verdict. 153 Rule 606(b) also follows case law in prohibiting jurors
from testifying that they misunderstood juror instructions, 154
misunderstood the law involved,155 or disregarded or failed to
understand certain evidence presented at trial. 5 6 It is silent on
whether evidence of compromise or majority vote verdicts will
be excluded. At least one leading scholar in the field has taken
the position that such evidence should not be allowed to come
from the jurors.'5 7 Furthermore, the scholars are in disagree-
ment over whether 606(b) permits juror testimony that they
considered facts not in evidence during the deliberations. 158
The Federal Rule does allow jurors to testify that they were
exposed to threats 159 or bribes, 160 that members of the jury con-
ducted an unauthorized view 161 or experiment,'6 2 and that media
150. Rothstein, Federal Rules of Evidence, Appendix § 606(b) (1973).
151. Id. at 78.,
152. Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 149 (3d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1119 (1976).
153. 3 J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence 606(04) at 606-23 (1976).
154. United States v. Stacey, 475 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1973).
155. United States v. Chereton, 309 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1962).
156. United States v. Dressier, 112 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1940).
157. 3 J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence 606(04) at 606-41 (1976).
158. Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140,149 n.20 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1119 (1976), cites the Congressional Conference
Report on the passage of Federal Rule of Evidence section 606(b) as follows:
"The Conference adopts the Senate amendment (which) ... does not permitjuror testimony about any matter occuring during the course of the jury's
deliberations." However, Judge Weinstein is of the opinion that juror consid-
eration of facts not in evidence is not barred by the new rule.
159. Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77, 83 n.11 (2d Cir. 1968).
160. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
161. Gafford v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary, 434 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1970).
162. United States v. Beach, 296 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1961).
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accounts came before them.
163
It is apparent that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) fails to
adequately tackle the impeachment problem. While it permits
juror testimony to impeach a verdict where majority case law
has done so, and prohibits such testimony where courts have
refused to do so in the past, in the areas of compromise verdicts
and consideration of facts not in evidence, where the courts
have been divided, the new rule offers no solution. While Con-
gress claims to have reached an accomodation between the con-
flicting policies of safeguarding the jury trial system and insur-
ing a just result in individual cases, in effect it has done nothing
more than codify existing case law.
Congress must make another attempt to give the federal
courts some guidance in the area of juror impeachment of ver-
dicts. When they begin their task it is recommended that they
give serious consideration to the realistic approach taken by
Chief Justice Burger, in Kilmes v. United States,6 4 before he
was elevated to the high court. In recommending that Congress
require federal courts to consider all juror affidavits relating to
jury misconduct this author is aware of the possible "Pandora's
Box" that this solution may open. Many of the reasons consist-
ently given for perpetuation of the traditional rule will have to
be dealt with. Juror harassment, juror falsification of affidavits
and the proliferation of new trials when reversible juror mis-
conduct is shown are serious problems without current an-
swers.
However, these problems of "expediency" can no longer stand
in the way of a defendant's right to a fair trial in the federal
court system. When a juror affidavit alleging some type of juror
misconduct is presented to the court, the judge must be required
to consider it. If, after doing so, the judge finds that even if the
allegations made are accurate no denial of a fair trial has been
shown he can be obliged to deny the motion for a new trial at
that juncture. If, however, the judge determines that a new trial
is warranted if the allegations in the affidavit are correct, he
should be required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to ex-
163. United States v. Kum Seng Seo, 300 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962); United
States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961).
164. 263 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
amine the jurors and determine their credibility. Based on the
findings at that hearing, the judge can make his final determina-
tion as to whether a new trial is warranted. This is the basic
approach proposed by Warren Burger nearly twenty years
ago. 6  It remains a plausible solution to the jury misconduct
question today. While this approach does not solve the problems
anticipated by those who adhere unthinkingly to the Mansfield
rule, such problems can no longer stand in the way of the crimi-
nal defendant's right to a fair trial in federal court.
PAUL JEFFREY WALLIN
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